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Abstract—The potential risk of privacy leakage prevents users
from sharing their honest opinions on social platforms. This
paper addresses the problem of privacy preservation if the query
returns the histogram of rankings. The framework of differential
privacy is applied to rank aggregation. The error probability of
the aggregated ranking is analyzed as a result of noise added
in order to achieve differential privacy. Upper bounds on the
error rates for any positional ranking rule are derived under the
assumption that profiles are uniformly distributed. Simulation
results are provided to validate the probabilistic analysis.
Keywords—Rank Aggregation, Privacy, Accuracy
I. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing interest in social networks and the avail-
ability of large datasets, rank aggregation has been studied
intensively in the context of social choice. From the NBA’s
Most Valuable Player to Netflix’s movie recommendations,
from web search to presidential elections, voting and ranking
are ubiquitous. Informally, rank aggregation is the problem
of combining a set of full or partial rankings of a set of
alternatives into a single consensus ranking. In recommender
systems, users are motivated to submit their rankings in order
to receive personalized services. On the other hand, they may
also be concerned about the risk of possible privacy leakage.
Even accumulated or anonymized datasets are not as “safe”
as they seem to be. Information on individual rankings or
preferences can still be learned even if the querier only has
access to global statistics. In 2006, Netflix launched a data
competition with 100 million movie ratings from half a million
anonymized users. However, researchers subsequently demon-
strated that individual users from this “sanitized” dataset could
be identified by matching with the Internet Movie Database
(IMDb). This raises the privacy concerns about sharing honest
opinions.
Differential privacy is a framework that aims to obscure
individuals’ appearances in the database. It makes no assump-
tions on the attacker’s background knowledge. Mathematical
guarantees are provided in [1] and [2]. Differential privacy
has gained popularity in various applications, such as social
networks [3], recommendations [4], advertising [5], etc. How-
ever, there is a trade-off between the accuracy of the query
results and the privacy of the individuals included in the
statistics. In [6], the authors showed that good private social
recommendations are achievable only for a small subset of
users in the social network.
In this paper, we apply the framework of differential privacy
to rank aggregation. Privacy is protected by adding noise to
the query of ranking histograms. The user can then apply a
rank aggregation rule to the “noisy” query results. In general,
stronger noise guarantees better differential privacy. However,
excessive noise reduces the utility of the query results. We
measure the utility by the probability that the aggregated
ranking is accurate. A summary of the contributions of this
paper is as follows:
• A privacy-preserving algorithm for rank aggregation is
proposed. Instead of designing differential privacy for
each individual ranking rule, we propose to add noise to
the ranking histogram, irrespective of the ranking rules
to be used.
• General upper bounds on the ranking error rate are
derived for all positional ranking rules. Moreover, we
show that the asymptotic error rate approaches zero
when the number of voters goes to infinity for any
ranking rules with a fixed number of candidates.
• An example using Borda count is given to show how to
extend the proposed analysis to derive a tighter upper
bound on the error rate for a specific positional rule.
Simulations are performed to validate the analysis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We define
the problem of rank aggregation, introduce the definition
of differential privacy, and describe the privacy preserving
algorithm in Section 2. We then discuss the accuracy of the
algorithm, and provide analytical upper bounds on the error
rates in Section 3, followed by simulation results in Section 4,
and conclusions in Section 5.
II. DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY IN RANK AGGREGATION
A. Rank Aggregation: Definitions and Notations
Let C = {1, ...,M} be a finite set of M candidates, M ≥ 3.
Denote the set of permutations on C by TM . Denote the number
of voters by N . Each ballot xi, i = 1, ..., N is an element of
TM , or a strict linear ordering. A rank aggregation algorithm,
or a ranking rule is a function g : TNM → TM . The input
(x1, . . . , xN ) is called a profile.
A ranking rule g is neutral if it commutes with permutations
on C [7]. Intuitively, a neutral ranking method is not biased in
favor of or against any candidate.
A ranking rule g is anonymous if the “names” of the voters
do not matter [7], i.e.
g(x1, ..., xN ) = g(pi(x1, ..., xN )) (1)
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2for any permutation pi on 1, ..., N . For an anonymous ranking
method, we use the anonymized profile, a vector q ∈ NM !,
instead of the complete profile (x1, . . . , xN ) as the input. Let
q denote the histogram of rankings: It counts the number of
appearances of each ranking in all n rankings. The rank aggre-
gation function can therefore be rewritten as g : NM ! → TM .
An anonymous ranking rule is scale invariant if the output
depends only on the empirical distribution of votes v = q/N ,
not the number of voters N . That is,
g(q) = g(αq) (2)
for any α > 0.
There are many different neutral and scale invariant rank
aggregation algorithms. Popular ones include plurality, Borda
count, instant run-off, the Kemeny-Young method and so on.
Each algorithm has its own merits and disadvantages. For
example, the Kemeny-Young method satisfies the Condorcet
criterion (a candidate preferred to any other candidate by a
strict majority of voters must be ranked first) but is computa-
tionally expensive. In fact it is NP-Hard even for M = 4 [8].
This is especially an issue for recommender systems since the
number of items to be recommended can be large.
A class of ranking rules, known as the positional rules, has
an edge in computational complexity. A positional rule takes
complete rankings as input, and assigns a score to each can-
didate according to their position in a ranking. The candidates
are sorted by their total scores summed up from all rankings.
The time complexity is only O(MN +M logM), where the
M logM term comes from sorting. All positional rules satisfy
anonymity and neutrality but fail the Condorcet criterion [9].
A positional rule with M candidates has M parameters:
s1 ≥ · · · ≥ sM , where si is the score assigned to the ith
highest-ranked candidate. We can further normalize the scores
without affecting the ranking rule so that s1 = 1, sM = 0.
Borda count, a widely used positional rule, is specified by
si = (M − i)/(M − 1). Note that plurality is a positional
rule with si = 0 for i ≥ 2. Plurality is popular due to
its simplicity. However, it is not ideal as a rank aggregation
algorithm because it discards too much information. In this
paper, we specifically focus on positional rules because of their
computational efficiency and ease of error rate analysis.
B. Differential Privacy
In this paper, we consider a strong notion of privacy, differen-
tial privacy [1]. Intuitively, a randomized algorithm has good
differential privacy if its output distribution is not sensitive
to a single entity’s information. For any dataset A, let N (A)
denote the set of neighboring datasets, each differing from A
by at most one record, i.e., if A′ ∈ N (A), then A′ has exactly
one entry more or one entry less than A.
Definition 1. [2] A random algorithm M satisfies (, δ)-
differential privacy if for any neighboring datasets A and A′,
and any subset S of possible outcomes Range(M),
Pr[M(A) ∈ S] ≤ exp()× Pr[M(A′) ∈ S] + δ. (3)
Remark: (, δ)-differential privacy is a slight relaxation from
the -differential privacy in that the ratio
Pr[M(A) ∈ S]/Pr[M(A′) ∈ S]
need not be bounded if both probabilities are very small. Dif-
ferential privacy has been widely used in various applications
[4], [5].
C. Privacy Preserving Algorithms
Much work has been done on developing differentially private
algorithms [10], [11]. Let D denote the set of all datasets, and
f is an operation on the dataset, such as sum, count, etc.
Definition 2. The l2-sensitivity ∆f of a function f : D → Rd
is
∆f(A) = max
A′∈N (A)
‖f(A)− f(A′)‖2
for all A′ ∈ N (A) differing in at most one element, and
A,A′ ∈ D.
Theorem 1. [2] Define M(A) to be f(A) + N (0, σ2Id×d).
M provides (, δ)-differential privacy, whenever
σ2 ≥ 2 ln(
2
δ )
2
· max
A′∈N (A)
‖f(A)− f(A′)‖22, (4)
for all A′ ∈ N (A) differing in at most one element, and
A,A′ ∈ D.
In our model, f(A) is the histogram of all rankings, i.e.
the input vector q defined in Section II-A. It is clear that the
l2 sensitivity of f(A) is 1, since adding or removing a vote
can only affect one element of q by 1. In the exposition, we
will denote the private data and released data by x and xˆ
respectively. When we add noise n to a variable x, we write
xˆ = x+ noise. Thus
qˆ = q +N (0, σ2IM !×M !) (5)
where σ2 = 2 ln(2δ )/
2, and M is the number of candidates.
We use Gaussian instead of Laplacian noise which achieves
stronger -privacy [1], because Gaussian noise enjoys the
nice property that any linear combination of jointly Gaussian
random variables is Gaussian.
Note that there is a positive probability that qˆi < 0 for some
index i. This does not harm our analysis since positional rules
are well defined even if we allow negative vote counts.
Finally, we define the error rate of a privacy preserving
rank aggregation algorithm on ranking. The error rate is the
probability that the aggregated ranking changes after adding
noise. This probability depends on the ranking rule, the noise
distribution, and the distribution of profiles.
Definition 3. The error rate PMe of a privacy preserving
rank aggregation algorithm g with M candidates is defined
as E1{g(q)6=g(qˆ)}.
3III. GENERAL ERROR BOUNDS
In this section, we discuss the error rates in the rank aggrega-
tion problem. We give the expression for the general error rate
and derive upper bounds on the error rate for all positional
ranking rules under the assumption that profiles are uniformly
distributed.
A. Geometric Perspective of Positional Ranking Systems
We normalize the anonymous profile by dividing by the
number of voters N . The resulting vector v = q/N is the
empirical distribution of votes, v ∈ [0, 1]M !. All empirical
distributions are contained in a unit simplex, called the rank
simplex:
V = {v ∈ RM ! :
M !∑
i=1
vi = 1 and vi ≥ 0 for ∀i}. (6)
A rank simplex with M candidates has a dimension of
M !− 1. We assume that the normalized profile v is uniformly
distributed on the rank simplex V .
Geometrically, a ranking rule is a partition of the rank
simplex. For positional ranking rules, the rank simplex is parti-
tioned into M ! congruent polytopes by
(
M
2
)
hyperplanes. Each
polytope represents a ranking, and each hyperplane represents
the equality of the score of two candidates. Moreover, each
polytope is uniquely defined by M − 1 hyperplanes and the
faces of the rank simplex V . An example of how to define the
hyperplane from given ranking rule will be given in Section
IV.
To maintain neutrality, we break ties randomly when there
is a tie. For example, if the score of candidate a and b happens
to be equal, then we rank a ahead of b with probability one
half. We only mention tie as a side remark since it does not
have an affect on the probability analysis.
Proposition 1. Let
vˆ = v + ω (7)
where ω is a M !-dimensional random variable with distribu-
tion
N (0, σˆ2IM !×M !),
where σˆ2 = 2 ln (2/δ)2N2 . We have
E1{g(q)6=g(qˆ)} = E1{g(v)6=g(vˆ)}.
Proof: This follows directly from the scale invariant
property of the ranking rules.
Remark: Note that vˆ may not be in the probability simplex.
The ranking result of vˆ is uniquely defined by the cone formed
by M − 1 hyperplanes representing the equality of scores of
two candidates.
B. An Upper Bound on the General Error Rate
Rather than providing different upper bounds for each and
every positional rule, we derive a general bound that works
for any positional rule. Therefore, the user can decide which
positional rule to apply to the queried noisy histogram, and the
system has some guarantee on the error rate given the privacy
level.
If noise switches the order of the scores of any two can-
didates, then the final ranking necessarily changes. Let Si(v),
Sj(v) denote the score of candidate i and j for an arbitrary
positional rule given the profile v. As mentioned in Section
III-A, there are
(
M
2
)
hyperplanes separating the simplex into
M ! polytopes. The hyperplanes are defined by Si = Sj for any
pair of candidates i, j, and there are
(
M
2
)
such pairs. Let βij
denote the unit normal vector of hyperplane Hij : Si = Sj .
That is,
||βij ||2 = 1 (8)
Then βij · w is the scalar projection of βij for vector
w. Let Dij(v) be the distance from v to hyperplane Hij .
Given the uniform distribution of v over the rank simplex,
Dij(v) is a continuous random variable that takes values on
[−√2,√2] (√2 is the edge length of the probability simplex).
The sign indicates on which side of the hyperplane v locates.
Let pD denote the probability density function of Dij . By the
neutrality of positional rules, pD is identical for any i 6= j and
pD(l) = pD(−l). By symmetry,∫ √2
0
pD(l)dl =
1
2
. (9)
Geometrically, pD(l) is proportional to the (M !− 2)-measure
of the cross section of the hyperplane Hij(l) with the simplex,
where Hij(l) is parallel to Hij with distance l.
Lemma 1. Let pD be as defined as above. Then pD is maximal
at 0 on [0,
√
2] for any positional rule.
Proof: Let H be the hyperplane defined by the equality
of the score of two candidates for an arbitrary positional rule,
and β be the unit normal vector of H. That is, H = {v ∈
RM ! : βv = 0}. Let H + sβ denote the hyperplane βv = s.
Let X1, . . . , XM ! be i.i.d. random variables with the following
density function:
f(x) =
{
e−x if x ≥ 0
0 otherwise.
(10)
That is, Xj’s are independent exponential random variables
with parameter λ = 1. The density of the random variable
Y =
∑M !
i=1 βjXj is [12]
G(s) =
∫
H+sβ
M !∏
j=1
f(x)dVolH (11)
where VolH denotes the Lebesgue measure on H. It is shown
in [12] that
VolM !−2(H ∩ V) =
√
M !
Γ(M !− 1)
∫
H
M !∏
j=1
f(x)dVolH (12)
where VolM !−2 denotes M !−2 - dimensional volume, V is the
unit regular M ! − 1 - simplex embedded in RM !, as defined
in Equation (6). This result is shown in [12] for H passing
4through the origin and centroid, but it holds for any hyperplane,
i.e.,
VolM !−2
(
(H+ sβ) ∩ V) = √M !
Γ(M !− 1)G(s). (13)
The characteristic function of Y is
φY (t) =
M !∏
j=1
φXj (βjt) =
M !∏
j=1
(1 + iβjt)
−1. (14)
Note that for any entry j, there is a corresponding entry j′ such
that the j′th ranking is the reversed order of the jth ranking.
By symmetry, βj = −βj′ , (1 + iβjt)(1 + iβj′t) = 1 + β2j t2.
Without loss of generality, suppose βj > 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤M !/2,
then
φY (t) =
M !/2∏
j=1
(1 + β2j t
2)−1. (15)
Since φY (t) is always real and positive, by Bochner’s
theorem [13], G(s) is a positive-definite function, i.e.,
|G(s)| ≤ G(0).
This is also easy to prove by directly applying the inverse
Fourier Transform:
|G(s)| =
∣∣∣∣ 12pi
∫ +∞
−∞
φY (t)e
−istds
∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
∣∣φY (t)e−ist∣∣ ds
=
1
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
φY (t)
∣∣e−ist∣∣ ds
=
1
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
φY (t)ds
= G(0). (16)
Thus we have,
VolM !−2
(
(H+ sβ) ∩ V) ≤ VolM !−2(H ∩ V).
Lemma 2. The ranking error rate PMe satisfies
PMe ≤
(
M
2
)
· 2
τ∫
0
pD(l)Q
(
l
σˆ
)
dl +Q
( τ
σˆ
)
,∀τ > 0,
for all positional ranking aggregation algorithms with M can-
didates and N voters, taking input from the (, δ)-differentially
private system defined in Section II-C.
Proof: The main idea of the proof is as follows. Divide
the rank simplex into two parts: a “high error” region, denoted
as RH , and a “low error” region, denoted as RL, as shown in
Figure 1. RH consists of the thin slices of the simplex close to
the boundary hyperplanes. RL occupies most of the simplex,
but P (error|v ∈ RL) is upper bounded by the error rate at
the point closest to the boundary. We choose an appropriate
thickness τ of RH such that the sum of the error rate of the
two parts is minimized. Thus we have,
PMe =P
M
e in RH + P
M
e in RL
≤
(
M
2
)
· P (Si, Sj switches order in RH) + PMe in RL
=
(
M
2
)
· 2
τ∫
0
pD(l)P (βij · ω > l)dl + PMe in RL
=
(
M
2
)
· 2
τ∫
0
pD(l)Q
(
l
σˆ||βij ||2
)
dl + PMe in RL (17)
Q(·) is the tail probability of the standard normal distribu-
tion and is decreasing on [0,+∞). Thus for the “low error”
region, we have,
PMe in RL < P (v ∈ RL) ·Q
(
τ
σˆ||βij ||2
)
< Q
(
τ
σˆ||βij ||2
)
(18)
From Equation (8), (17), and (18), we have,
PMe ≤
(
M
2
)
· 2
τ∫
0
pD(l)Q
(
l
σˆ
)
dl +Q
( τ
σˆ
)
. (19)
Theorem 2. For any positional ranking aggregation algorithm
with M candidates and N voters, taking input from the (, δ)-
differentially private system defined in Section II-C, the ranking
error rate PMe (N) satisfies
PMe (N) ≤
(
M
2
)
M !− 1√
2
τ +Q
(
Nτ√
2 ln(2/δ)
)
,∀τ > 0.
Proof: By Lemma 2, we have,
PMe ≤
(
M
2
)
· 2
τ∫
0
pD(l)Q
(
l
σˆ
)
dl +Q
( τ
σˆ
)
≤
(
M
2
)
· 2
τ∫
0
pD(l)Q(0)dl +Q
( τ
σˆ
)
=
(
M
2
)
·
τ∫
0
pD(l)dl +Q
( τ
σˆ
)
(20)
By Lemma 1, for any positional rules, pD(l) ≤ pD(0).
Hence we have,
PMe ≤
(
M
2
)
·
τ∫
0
pD(0)dl +Q
( τ
σˆ
)
=
(
M
2
)
· pD(0)τ +Q
( τ
σˆ
)
(21)
5For positional rules, all hyperplanes Hij pass through the
(M ! − 1)-simplex centroid for any i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,M} since
the profile at the centroid must be a tie for all candidates
due to symmetry. From the literature in high dimensional
geometry [12], we know that the largest cross section through
the centroid of a regular M ! − 1-simplex is exactly the slice
that contains M ! − 2 of its vertices and the midpoint of the
remaining two vertices. The (M ! − 2)-measure of the cross
section is
√
M !/
(√
2(M !− 2)!) for the probability simplex.
Since the (M ! − 1)-measure of the probability simplex is√
M !/(M !− 1)!, we have,
pD(0) ≤
√
M !/
(√
2(M !− 2)!)√
M !/(M !− 1)! =
M !− 1√
2
(22)
From Equations (21) and (22), and the fact that
σˆ2 = 2 ln( 2δ )/
2N2, we have
PMe (N) ≤
(
M
2
)
M !− 1√
2
τ +Q
( τ
σˆ
)
=
(
M
2
)
M !− 1√
2
τ +Q
(
Nτ√
2 ln(2/δ)
)
(23)
By taking the derivative with respect to τ , we can show that
the right side of Equation (23) is minimized when
τ =
√
2 ln(2/δ)
N
√
−2 ln
√
pi ln(2/δ)M(M − 1)(M !− 1)√
2N
.
(24)
Remark: To better understand this upper bound, we can use
a Q-function approximation to represent the result of Theorem
2. It is known that
Q(x) ≤ e
− x22√
2pix
,∀x > 0. (25)
This is a good approximation when x is large [14]. Thus we
can rewrite Equation (23) as
PMe (N) ≤
(
M
2
)
M !− 1√
2
τ +
√
ln(2/σˆ)
2
√
piNτ
e−
(Nτ)2
4 ln(2/σˆ) ,∀τ > 0.
(26)
We can further simplify the expression by letting
τ = 2
√
lnN ln(2/δ)/(N):
PMe (N) ≤
1
N
((
M
2
)
(M !− 1)√2 lnN ln(2/δ)

+
1
2
√
pi lnN
)
.
(27)
It is shown in (27) that the error rate goes to 0 at least as fast
as O(
√
lnN
N ) for fixed δ, .
C. Asymptotic Error Rate
In this section, we analyze the asymptotic error rate for any
positional ranking rule. We start by showing a tighter bound
on the general error rate that can be derived from the proof of
Theorem 2.
Fig. 1: An example of Petrie polygon (skew orthogonal pro-
jections) of three candidates. Three hyperplanes, under Borda
count ranking rule, separate the simplex into six polytopes.
Lemma 3. An upper bound for the ranking error rate of any
(, δ)-differentially private positional ranking system with M
candidates and N voters is(
M
2
)√
2(M !− 1)Q
(
Nτ
2
√
2 ln(2/δ)
)
τ +Q
(
Nτ√
2 ln(2/δ)
)
for ∀τ > 0.
Proof: Since the Q-function is convex on [0,+∞), by
Jensen’s Inequality, from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we have
PMe (N) ≤
(
M
2
)
· 2
τ∫
0
pD(l)Q
(
l
σˆ
)
dl +Q
( τ
σˆ
)
≤
(
M
2
)
· 2
τ∫
0
pD(0)Q
(
l
σˆ
)
dl +Q
( τ
σˆ
)
≤
(
M
2
)
· 2pD(0)Q
( τ
2σˆ
)
+Q
( τ
σˆ
)
=
(
M
2
)√
2(M !− 1)Q
(
Nτ
2
√
2 ln(2/δ)
)
τ
+Q
(
Nτ√
2 ln(2/δ)
)
. (28)
Lemma 3 slightly improves the bound in Theorem 2. We
use this lemma to assist the proof of the following Theorem.
Theorem 3. For any positional ranking aggregation algorithm
with M candidates, taking input from the (, δ)-differentially
private system defined in Section II-C,
lim
N→∞
PMe (N) = 0
6for any given  and δ.
Proof: This directly follows from Lemma 3 and the
Bounded Convergence Theorem.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we use Borda count with three candidates
as an example. Once the ranking rule is known, we can
derive a tighter bound than the general error rate bound
in Section III, because we know exactly what the pairwise
comparison boundaries are. We will compare all upper bounds
with the simulation error rates.
In Borda count, for every vote the candidate ranked first
receives 1 point, the second receives 0.5 points, and the bottom
candidate receives no points. The aggregated rank is sorted
according to the total points each candidate receives. We list
3! = 6 permutations in the following order, and we will stick to
this order for the rest of this paper: abc, acb, cab, cba, bca, bac.
Let
M =
(
1 1 0.5 0 0 0.5
0.5 0 0 0.5 1 1
0 0.5 1 1 0.5 0
)
. (29)
Then we have (
Sa
Sb
Sc
)
= Mv, (30)
where v is defined in Section III-A and Sa, Sb, Sc are the
aggregated score of candidates a, b and c respectively. The
hyperplane Hab satisfies Sa = Sb,
2v1 + 2v2 + v3 + v6 = v1 + v4 + 2v5 + 2v6 (31)
i.e.
Hab : v1 + 2v2 + v3 − v4 − 2v5 − v6 = 0 (32)
Similarly, we have
Hbc : v1 − v2 − 2v3 − v4 + v5 + 2v6 = 0 (33)
Hac : 2v1 + v2 − v3 − 2v4 − v5 + v6 = 0 (34)
With Equations (32), (33) and (34), we can compute the
volume of the cross section made by the hyperplane cutting
through the probability simplex (6), using methods proposed
in [15]. Then an upper bound specifically for Borda count can
be derived with a similar approach as Theorem 2 or Lemma 3.
Figure 2 shows the simulation results of Borda count with
3 candidates and 2,000 voters, repeated 100,000 times. We set
δ = 5× 10−4 (which is 0.1 divided by the number of voters),
and plot the graph of error rate with  taking values between
0.05 and 0.24. We compare the simulation results with the
general upper bound derived in Theorem 2 and the improved
upper bound in Lemma 3, as well as the ranking rule-specific
upper bound described above.
Figure 3 shows the simulation results for Borda count with 3
candidates with fixed , repeated 20,000 times. We set  = 0.1
and δ = 0.1/N , where N is the number of voters. The number
of voters varies from 1,000 to 100,000. The error vanishes
fast with a growing number of voters, even if we set δ to
be inversely proportional to the number of voters. We also
Fig. 2: Error rate for vs .
Fig. 3: Error rate vs number of voters.
compare the simulation results with the general upper bound
derived in Theorem 2 and the improved upper bound in Lemma
3, as well as the ranking rule-specific upper bound described
above.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we apply the framework of differential privacy
to rank aggregation by adding noise in the votes. We analyze
the probability that the aggregated ranking becomes inaccurate
due to the noise and derive upper bounds on the error rates
of ranking for all positional ranking rules under the assump-
tion that profiles are uniformly distributed. The bounds can
be tightened using techniques in high dimensional polytope
volume computation if we are given a specific ranking rule.
Our results provide insights into the trade-offs between privacy
and accuracy in rank aggregation.
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